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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Stephen Derrig, an Akron firefighter, went to a number of doctors 
seeking a diagnosis for his breathlessness and fatigue.2  Laying in a hospital bed he 
was told that he had tested positive for HIV, which had progressed to AIDS.3  Derrig 
is a heterosexual man who is married.4  Luckily, neither his wife nor his children has 
been diagnosed with the virus.5  He is not an intravenous drug user.6  He contracted 
the disease while at his job, as a fire fighter.7  It is not known by whom he was 
infected.8  As a firefighter he has assisted countless people.9  He does not know in 
which encounter he contracted the infection.10  He assumes he became infected on 
the job because he does not engage in any of the behaviors that are typically 
associated with HIV transmission.11 
He went public with his case in order to shatter the misperceptions surrounding 
AIDS.12  He believes that an infected public safety employee should continue to 
work in his or her position.13  One of the differences from Derrig’s time of infection 
to today is awareness.  The medical profession and governmental agencies have 
publicly stated the employees in fields where transmission is a possibility should be 
able to continue in their positions as long as universal precautions are utilized. 
Physicians have offered their support to Derrig.14  Derrig is back to work staffing 
the fire truck.15  He is not serving in his former position as a firefighter.  Contrary to 
                                                                
2Julie Wallace, Akron Man Wins Workers’ Compensation for Disease He Knows He 
Contracted on the Job, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 13, 2002, at A1. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
6Id. 
7Julie Wallace, supra note 2, at 2. 
8Id. 
9Id. 
10Id. at 3. 
11Wallace, supra note 2, at 3. 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15Wallace, supra note 2, at 4. 
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popular belief the position transfer is not due to the fire department being fearful of 
transmission, but that Derrig would be compromising the fragility of his immune 
system.16   
Dr. Trish Perl, M.D., at John Hopkins Hospital and Health System in Baltimore, 
oversees a committee that devises work plans for employees who have contagious 
diseases.17  She claims, “ [All] too often people want to spirit away the worker out of 
fear he or she will spread the disease.”18  She argues that with simple precautions it is 
not necessary for an employee to quit.19  The precautions will provide enough 
protection to contain the disease.  She points out that neither Derrig’s wife nor 
children have the disease, which verifies that the disease is not easily transmittable.20   
Society, including the legal profession, fears the risk of transmission of HIV in an 
occupational setting.  This is particularly true for those in the health care and public 
safety settings (fire fighters, police, and healthcare practitioners).  This note will 
assert that the law should afford HIV infected public safety and healthcare 
employees the right to continue in their occupations.  According to current medical 
evidence, when public safety and healthcare employees use universal precautions the 
risk of transmission to a person(s) assisted is insignificant.   
At the beginning of the epidemic, the medical profession had yet to conduct 
research, and the risks of HIV/AIDS were largely unknown.  Under those 
circumstances, it is understandable that the courts may have been overly cautious 
when confronted with cases involving HIV/AIDS.  However, twenty years after the 
epidemic surfaced, the medical evidence should calm irrational fears that have 
plagued society.  The misguided fear arises because the job duties of public safety 
and healthcare personnel may include direct contact with bodily fluids.   
Currently, the great majority of courts have ruled that HIV infected employees 
should not continue in these occupations.  Viewed in the light of available medical 
evidence and statistical data, these rulings represent an overreaction caused by fear 
surrounding the epidemic.  These courts have not measured actual risk against the 
statutory standards required by the Rehabilitation Act of 197321 and the Americans 
with Disability Act (ADA).22  In these cases, the courts have held that when there is 
any conceivable risk, no matter how theoretical, the employee must discontinue his 
present work.  Only a few courts have carefully assessed the medical evidence and 
followed statutory guidelines, which permit employees to continue in their 
occupations because the risk that HIV public safety and healthcare employees pose 
to the public is infinitesimal.   
This note will critically analyze decisions that do not support public safety and 
health care employees continuing in their professions.  The note opens first with an 
examination of the history of AIDS and recent treatment of the disease.  The second 
                                                                
16Id. 
17Id. 
18Id. 
19Julie Wallace, supra note 2, at 5. 
20Id. 
2129 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
2242 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. 
42 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 19:39 
and third sections discuss the statutes and two leading case decisions that involve the 
treatment of AIDS.  The fourth section will analyze the cases that do not support 
employment of HIV persons in the public safety and healthcare fields.  The fifth 
section discusses cases that favorably treat HIV persons allowing them to continue in 
their positions in the public safety and healthcare fields.  Finally, in the sixth section 
the note will conclude with what one may draw from the present medical evidence 
and statistics and how the present treatment of HIV is similar to the past treatment of 
persons thought to present a threat of communism.   
II.  HISTORY AND COMMUNICABILITY OF THE DISEASE 
A.  History 
AIDS first emerged in the mid-1970s in Central Africa.23  One of the first known 
persons to be infected with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was 
a surgeon working in Zaire.24  In the 1980’s similar symptoms appeared in New York 
City’s gay community.25  It was a disease that seemed to primarily affect one’s 
immune system.26  The Center for Disease Control (CDC), the leading federal 
agency for protecting the health and safety of people, was unsure how to handle, 
prevent, and minimize the impact of the disease.27   
In 1981, a French-Canadian flight attendant, known as Gaetan Dugas, was treated 
in New York City for a skin condition identified as Kaposi’s Sarcoma.28  The 
condition is an ailment of AIDS.  Through Dugas’ sexual partners, medical 
researchers gained knowledge that the disease was transmitted through sexual 
contact.29  By the mid-1980’s, the disease was prevalent in gay communities across 
America.30   
Two decades ago AIDS was known primarily as a disease that infected gay 
men.31  A recent CDC survey showed that more than thirty percent of gay black 
males ages twenty-three to twenty–nine in six United States cities have HIV.32  
                                                                
23MARGARET C. JASPER, AIDS LAW 1 (Oceana Publication, Inc., 2000). 
24Id. 
25 Id. 
26See id. 
27Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Nov. 2, 2002, http://www.cdc.gov/about 
cdc.htm (last visited Mar. 2003).  
28See JASPER, supra note 23, at 2. 
29See id. 
30Susan J. Levy, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory testing for Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome—AIDS, 37 Emory LJ 217, footnote 51 citing to Rabin, The AIDS 
Epidemic & City Bathhouses: A Constituional Analysis 10 J. HEALTH POL. POLY. 729, 743 
(1986). 
31Carol Clark, Paying the price of AIDS, http://archives.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/ 
aids/stories/social.cost.html (last visited Mar. 2003). 
32Caroline Palmer, Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross:  Evolving And Emerging 
Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455, 
464-465 (2001). 
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However, today it is a disease that infects people of every age, nationality, and 
sexuality.33  Presently, there are approximately 800,000 to 900,000 people living in 
the United States who are infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).34  
Each year an additional 40,000 people will become infected.35  Universally, there are 
approximately forty million people living with HIV around the world.36   
The disease is communicated through sexual contact, the exchange of bodily 
fluids, and from mother to child through pregnancy.37  Having unprotected sex, 
sharing used needles, and a mother passing the disease to her child through vaginal 
fluids or breast-feeding are the most common forms of transmission.38  A person who 
is infected with the HIV virus may remain healthy and show no physical effects for 
four to seven years.39 
Once a person is infected with HIV it is inevitable that the infection will progress 
to AIDS.40  The virus invades primarily white cells and body tissues.41  The virus 
attaches to the cell and fuses into the cell’s membrane.42  The effect is that the body 
is unable to fight off infection and the body’s immune system is compromised.43   
Society has reacted to AIDS hysterically, with minimal empathy, logic, or 
compassion.  A case in 1991 illustrates this point.44  After John Doe was arrested, he 
disclosed to police officers that he was HIV positive.45  Later that day, Doe’s car 
rolled down a hill and struck a neighbor’s fence.46  The police told the neighbor that 
Doe was infected with AIDS.47  The neighbor was very distraught because Doe’s 
children and the neighbor’s children went to school together.48  The neighbor 
                                                                
33Clark, supra note 31. 
34Clark, supra note 31. 
35Clark, supra note 31. 
36Millions Mark World AIDS Day, (Dec. 1, 2002), http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/ 
12/01/aids.day/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
37Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 407 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
38DONALD T. DICKSON, HIV, AIDS, AND THE LAW, LEGAL ISSUES FOR SOCIAL WORK 
PRACTICE AND POLICY 103-104 (Aldine De Gruyter ed., Hawethorne 2001). 
39Dr. Steve Salvatore, Researchers create 3-D Image of How HIV Attacks June 18, 1998 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9806/18/aids.virus.02/index.htm (Mar. 2006). 
40AIDS.org, http://www.aids.org/FactSheets/101-what-is-aids.html (follow “Fact Sheets,” 
follow “What is Aids,” follow “Is There a Cure for Aids”). 
41See SALVATORE, supra note 39. 
42Id. 
43See id, supra note 37. 
44Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).  
45Id. at 379. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. 
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contacted other parents and the media.49  Consequently, the next day nineteen 
children were removed from the school Doe’s children attended.50  These events 
occurred because of the irrational fear surrounding the disease.   
The disease affects every aspect of a person’s life.  The stigma attached to 
HIV/AIDS has horrendous consequences.  Society’s treatment of the disease causes 
a person infected with AIDS to have not only emotional, but financial consequences 
as well, such as the loss of the person’s job and health insurance.  These are 
consequences that may lead to poverty.  Despite contrary evidence, society is not 
convinced that HIV cannot be spread through casual contact.51   
Early on, the government did not address society’s fear of the disease.52  In the 
crucial years of the 1980’s, the administration, led by Ronald Reagan, did little to 
calm the apprehension and falsities surrounding the disease.53  Twenty years after 
AIDS appeared in the United States, the legal profession still struggles with the 
coming to terms with the disease, just as much as the rest of the population. 
B.  Precautions 
To prevent the transmission of HIV in occupational settings, leading government 
agencies such as the CDC, as well as others, recommend the use of universal 
precautions.  
One such government agency is the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA).  They suggest wearing gloves, protective glasses, and 
masks.54  It did not make any of these provisions mandatory until 1992.55  Another, 
the CDC, identifies some of the same precautions such as the use of gloves, gowns, 
aprons, masks, or protective eyewear, which can reduce the risk of exposure of the 
health care worker's skin or mucous membranes to potentially infective materials. In 
addition, under universal precautions, the CDC recommends that all health care 
workers take precautions to prevent injuries caused by needles, scalpels, and other 
sharp instruments or devices. 56 
The following is a partial list of universal precautions that the CDC publishes:  
1) Employees should wash their hands as soon as feasible following 
contact with blood or other infectious diseases.57 
                                                                
49See Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 379. 
50Id. 
51See DICKSON, supra note 36, at 4. 
52Caroline Palmer & Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross:  Evolving And Emerging 
Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM.  MITCHELL L. REV., 455, 
459 (2001) (discussing the changes in laws that affect people with HIV/AIDS throughout the 
United States).  
53Id. 
54See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 4. 
55See id. 
56Universal Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of HIV and Other Bloodborne 
Infections, (1987) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/Blood/UNIVERSA.HTM, (last visited Mar. 
2003). 
5729 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(vi) (2003).  
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2) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be bent 
or recapped unless the employer can demonstrate that no alternative is 
feasible.58 
3) Contaminated needles shall be disposed of in puncture resistant 
containers.59 
4) An employer shall have an exposure control plan in place and update it 
annually.60 
When a person follows these precautions there is an extraordinarily small 
possibility of transmission.  In July 1991, the CDC acknowledged that HIV infected 
healthcare workers generally pose no risk of transmitting HIV if universal 
precautions are followed.61  The CDC indirectly asserted that when the workplace 
adopts a policy of universal precautions, the probability of transmission is virtually 
eliminated.62 
C.  Statistics on Occupational Transmission 
The crucial question posed to society is if an HIV positive public safety or health 
care employee endangers the life of a person that they assist.  In July 1991, the CDC 
acknowledged that an HIV infected healthcare worker posed no risk of transmission 
to a patient if the worker adhered to universal precautions and did not perform 
invasive procedures.63  Realistically, it is quite improbable for a healthcare or public 
safety employee to infect a patient.   
Studies have shown that a vast majority of occupational transmissions of HIV 
occur through needle sticks, where a healthcare or public safety employee 
administers an injection.  Therefore for a healthcare or public safety employee to 
infect a patient or victim by this means, the worker would first have to stick 
themselves with a needle and then use the contaminated needle and poke the person 
assisted.  To transmit the infection otherwise would require a similarly extraordinary 
combination of events such as a worker cutting himself and then bleeding directly 
into the open wound of the person assisted.  
The improbability of occupational transmission to a patient or victim is 
evidenced by the fact that there are only six reported patients who have contacted 
HIV from a healthcare worker or a public safety employee since the beginning of the 
epidemic twenty years ago. Only one healthcare worker, Dr. Acer, a dentist 
practicing in the state of Florida, infected all six patients.  After the state 
investigated, it was reported that Dr. Acer did not use the recommended universal 
precautions.  In addition, his office had no written policy for sterilizing dental 
                                                                
5829 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(A) (2003). 
5929 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(viii)(A) (2003). 
6029 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(1)(C)(iv) (2003). 
61Patient Care Delivery Issues, 1 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002). 
62Ursula Smith, Modes of Transmission, Testing for HIV Antibodies, and Occupational 
Exposure to HIV, Vol. 98, NURS. TIMES, No. 6, 42 (Feb. 7, 2002).  
631 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002). 
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instruments and equipment.64  The observer is left with the impression that 
something extremely untoward and outside the realm of normal medical practice 
occurred in these six cases. 
Many more HIV transmissions have occurred from patient to health care and 
public safety employee, rather than from health care worker/public safety employee 
to persons assisted.  In the twenty years of the epidemic, there have been ninety-three 
reported cases of HIV transmissions from a person being assisted to a health care 
worker or public safety employee.65  Fifty-six percent of the ninety-three 
transmissions have been to health care workers.  Most occur through contaminated 
needle stick injuries.66  This usually occurs after the health care employee has treated 
the patient and is disposing of the needle.67  It is less likely that an assisted person 
would contract the disease from a public safety worker.  Logically, the public safety 
employee would first have to puncture or cut himself or herself to transmit the 
disease to an assisted person.  While the CDC acknowledges that some cases may go 
unreported, it is reasonably safe to conclude that the number of transmissions to 
health care and public safety workers establishes a benchmark for the outer limit of 
transmissions to patients and victims.68   
The risk of contracting HIV from a health care or public safety employee is 
staggeringly small when one considers the number of employees in public safety and 
health care professions and the number of people they are assisting.  The Department 
of Labor statistics indicate that there were 599,550 police officers69, 275,730 
firefighters70, 170,690 paramedics71, and 8,972,73072 healthcare workers (dentists, lab 
                                                                
64Smith, supra note 62, at 743, citing Centers for Disease Control, Update: Investigations 
of Persons Treated by HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 329 (1993).  (The report summarizes the preliminary findings of an investigation.  
The improper use of needles and syringes aiding in the transmission of HIV.) 
65Ippolito, Puro, Heptonstall, Jagger, De Carli, & Petrosillo, Occupational Human 
Immunodeficency Virus Infection in Health Care Workers: Worldwide cases Through 
September 1997, CID 1999; 28. 
66See id.  The CDC declared that the risk of HIV transmission to a health care worker from 
a patient after “percutaneous exposure to HIV infected blood is approximately 0.3 percent.”  
This standard has yet to be modified in any fashion.  The CDC defines exposure prone 
procedures as the “digital palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or simultaneous presence 
of a health care worker’s fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument in a poorly visualized 
or highly confined anatomic site.” 1 Health L. Prac. Guide § 10:11 (2002). 
67Id. 
68Id. 
69U.S. Department of Labor, http://www.bls.gov (last visited Mar. 2003).  The author will 
assume for purposes of analysis that there have been ninety-three transmissions to patients and 
victims during the twenty-year course of the epidemic (follow “Occupations, Occupational 
Employment Statistics, overview” follow “2002 National Industry Specific Occupational 
Employment & Wage Estimate.”)  
70Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
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workers, physicians, nurses) working in the United States in 2001.  To arrive at the 
risk to date, the number of reported transmissions (ninety-three) is divided by the 
number of possible transmissions that could occur between a professional and a 
person assisted.  To obtain the potential number of transmissions, the total number of 
employees is multiplied by the number of average contacts the employee has with 
the general public each day.  This figure is then multiplied by the number of days in 
a year (365), which is multiplied by twenty years.   
To calculate the number of contacts an employee has with the public, a variety of 
sources were used.  A report published by the Department of Justice stated that 
police officers have nearly 45 million face-to-face contacts with civilians in a year.73  
Using the number of contacts (45 million) and dividing that number of police 
(599,550) gives the approximate number of contacts per year per police officer as 
seventy-five.  To estimate the number of contacts fire fighters and paramedics 
average in a day, a national fire survey was used.74  An estimated number of fire and 
EMS calls made in the United States is approximately 8,453,854.75  Using this 
number divided by the number of fire and EMS workers in the United States 
(446,420) calculates to an average of nineteen contacts per year per worker.  D. 
Underwood is an ophthalmologist who conducted a case study that included the 
number of interaction between nine doctors and their patients.  Using Dr. 
Underwood’s study, an average of thirty-two patients per day are seen by each 
practitioner. 76   
Using these figures, the risk of a patient or victim contracting HIV in an 
encounter with a health care professional or public safety worker is estimated to be 
four out of every hundred billion contacts.77  This estimate represents the outer limit 
of the risk that exists, because it represents the risk of transmitting HIV from a 
person assisted to a health care or public safety worker, which is greater than the risk 
of transmission from a worker to a person assisted.  The actual risk may be much 
lower and may be 6/93rds of this figure (the ratio of the reported transmissions in 
                                                                
73U.S. Department of Justice, Use of Force by Police, http://www.ojp. usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
abstract/ufbponld.htm (last visited Mar. 2003). 
74PETER MATTHEWS, PART I 2001 NATIONAL RUN SURVEY, JUNE 2002 (published by 
Firehouse).   
75Id. 
76Walter L. Underwood: FACMPE, Improving Doctor/Patient Productivity Through 
Patient-Volume Measurement, http://www.ascrs.org/publications/ao/ae92underwood.html 
(last visited March 2003). 
77The calculation was done by taking the number of reported cases (93) and dividing that 
by the total number of contacts with patients and victims by health and public safety personell 
during the course of the epidemic.  This total is estimated by adding the total of police 
(599,550) multiplied by the number of average contacts per year by worker (75); plus total 
number of firefighters (275,730) and EMS (170,690) multiplied by the number of average 
contacts per year by worker (19); plus total number of health care (health care practitioners 
and technical occupations 6,001,950 + 2,970,780 = 8,972,730) multiplied by the number of 
average contacts per day by worker (32).  The total was then multiplied by days in a year 
(365) multiplied by the acknowledged number of years AIDS has been treated (20).  The 
equation is 93/ (899,325,000 + 169,077,080 + 2.096030E12 = .00000000004 – representative 
of the risk of an occupational worker infecting a person that he assists.  
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each direction), or 2.6 transmissions out of every trillion contacts.78  The risk of 
transmission is so vanishingly small, yet the courts have held that public safety and 
health care workers present a significant risk and should not practice in their 
occupations.79   
An article published by the American Bar Association in 1988 addressed the 
pending issue of probability of transmission from health care worker to patient.80  
The article emphasized the low risk of HIV transmission in the relationship.  The 
article argues that it would be unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job performance 
of health care workers because of the nominal risk.81  Comparatively, the National 
Weather Service estimates the odds of being struck by lightning in the U.S. is one in 
615,000. 82  Americans routinely are outside during electrical storms without 
worrying about being struck by lightening.  Yet, there is a much higher likelihood of 
being struck by lightning than contracting HIV when being treated by a public safety 
or health care employee.  Inherent risk exists in every human activity but at some 
point it becomes so slight that it is considered inconsequential. 
III.  STATUTES 
A.  Anti-Discrimination Legislation:  Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
and Americans with Disabilities Act 
The question that is posed to the courts, is whether a public safety employee who 
is infected with HIV or AIDS poses a direct threat to others, which cannot be 
eliminated by reasonable accommodation.  There are two statutory bodies of law that 
protect employees who are disabled from workplace discrimination. Public safety 
employees and healthcare workers fall under the protection of the statutes that are 
discussed below. 
                                                                
78Id. 
79The ratio above indicates the low risk that is present from public safety and healthcare 
employees to persons they are assisting.  An article published by the American Bar 
Association in 1988 addressed the pending issue of probability of transmission from health 
care worker to patient.  Eric N. Richardson & Salvatore J. Russo, Calming AIDS Phobia: 
Legal Implications of the Low Risk of Transmitting HIV in the Health Care, 28 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 733 (1995).  The article emphasized the low risk of HIV transmission in the 
relationship.  The article argues that it would be unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job 
performance of health care workers because of the nominal risk.  Id. 
As of 2003, there had been only six reported cases worldwide where patients have been 
infected by a health care worker and no reported instances where a public safety worker 
infected a person assisted.  Id. at 745.  The medical evidence suggests that the risk of HIV 
being transmitted from public safety or health care worker to patient is extremely low.  One 
study found that there was “no HIV transmission in 369 person hours of surgical exposure.”  
Id. at 744. (citing Audrey S. Rogers et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the 
Patients of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795, 1799 (1993). 
80See Richardson & Russo, supra note 79, at 733.  
81Id. 
82David H. Levy, When the Big Clouds Gather, THE PLAIN DEALER, PARADE MAGAZINE 4, 
May 18, 2003. 
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The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)83 protects HIV 
infected individuals from discrimination.  Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act 
protects “otherwise qualified” handicapped individuals (now “individuals with a 
disability”) from discrimination “under any program or activity receiving financial 
assistance.”84  “Otherwise qualified” limits coverage by requiring that individual in 
question be able to perform the essential functions of the job.  In 1974, the definition 
of an individual with a disability was expanded:  “any person who (i) has a physical 
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such a person’s 
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as 
having such an impairment.”85  To be considered disabled under the Act, the 
individual must be substantially limited as to a major life activity.86  Major life 
activities are functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and working.”87 
In 1991, Congress passed the ADA, which expands the coverage offered under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting private employers that have fifteen or 
more employees from discriminating against the disabled.88  The ADA parallels the 
Rehabilitation Act in that it uses much of the same language in the legislation.  
Under the ADA the definition of a disability is identical to the Rehabilitation Act.  A 
disability is considered: a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more life activities, or the disability has been of record, or the individual is 
perceived as being impaired.89  
The ADA provides, “no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to 
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 90 
                                                                
8329 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
8729 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
88See JASPER, supra note 23, at 22. 
89Id. 
9042 U.S.C. § 12112(a).  Mandatory HIV testing is lawful only if it can be shown that the 
employee poses a direct threat to himself or others.  Because the only known way that a virus 
can be transmitted is by an exchange of bodily fluids then in most cases there is no need for 
mandatory HIV testing.   
The American Disability Act (ADA) protects, qualified individuals with a disability from 
discrimination based on their disability 86(e).  The Right to Privacy and HIV Testing In the 
European Community and the United States, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2775, 2800 (1997), citing 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).  This includes medical examinations and inquiries.  After initial 
employment, the statute provides:  “a covered entity shall not require a medical examination 
and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such an employee is an individual 
with a disability or as to the nature and extent of the disability, unless such an examination is 
shown to be job related and consistent with business necessity.”  See Dickson, supra note 36, 
at 138 citing 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(A).  If a disabled person is unable to perform all the 
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Aside from the ADA expanding coverage to privately employed individuals, 
there are some additional differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  
The Rehabilitation Act inquires as to whether there is a significant risk as an element 
of qualification. The ADA, in addition, inquires as to whether there is a direct threat 
to others that cannot be eliminated through reasonable accommodations.91  Both of 
the statutes protect individuals that are otherwise qualified from discrimination in 
employment settings.  Several circuits have interpreted the two to be synonymous.92  
The ADA expressly provides that “nothing [herein] shall be construed to apply to a 
lesser standard than . . . under . . . the Rehabilitation Act . . . or the regulations issued 
…pursuant to [it].”93  Another difference is that the Rehabilitation Act includes a 
non-exhaustive list of major life activities that a disability may impair.  Under the 
ADA, there is no inclusive or exclusive list.  This enables the ADA to provide 
extensive coverage for individuals with disabilities.  The 101st Congress stated that 
one of the objectives of passing the Act was to protect individuals with HIV.94   
Administrative agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), view the ADA as 
covering all stages of HIV infection.  The EEOC stated “. . . impairments such as 
HIV infection are inherently limiting.”95  The DOJ explicitly includes HIV as a 
disability in its regulations.  The question may arise whether an asymptomatic 
individual is considered disabled.  If he is disabled then is he entitled to ADA 
protection?  The DOJ notes that the phrase, “symptomatic or asymptomatic” was 
inserted in response to those that thought clarification was necessary.  
                                                           
essential functions of the job, the court may consider whether any reasonable accommodation 
by the employer would allow the employee to perform his/her job functions satisfactorily.  See 
Dickson, supra note 36, at 144. 
91Adam G. Forrest, Note, Is There a Significant Risk or High Probability of HIV 
Transmissions from an Infected Health Care Worker to Others?  The Sixth Circuits Answer 
Lies in Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV 1763, 1768 (1999).  
Accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes “undue financial and administrative burdens,” 
or if it requires “a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.”  Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). 
92See FORREST, supra note 91, at 1768. 
9342 U.S.C. § 12201(a). 
94DICKSON, supra note 38, at 139. 
95Id.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) publishes guidelines that 
are quite specific about what is permissible or impermissible to ask prospective employees.  
Some of the impermissible subjects to inquire about are:  existing impairments, limitations on 
life activities, and singling out the individual to perform aspects of the job, but not singling out 
others.  Some of the permissible subjects that an employer can ask a prospective employee is:  
can the employee perform the job, asking every applicant to demonstrate ability to perform, 
and asking about required certifications or licenses.  Id. at 139, 91(b).  Under the ADA, 
voluntary examinations are permitted which have been integrated into the employee health 
program.  See Dickson, supra note 38, at 139, 91(c).  A covered entity shall make inquires into 
the ability of the employee to perform work related functions.  See Dickson, supra note 38, at 
139, 91(d).  An employer may impose medical tests after hiring, but under the ADA they must 
be job related and consistent with business use.  Id. at 140, 91. 
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The United States Supreme Court recently limited the ADA’s coverage.  In 
Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal,96 the Court ruled that if hiring an individual would 
pose a direct threat to himself, an employer may refuse to hire the individual without 
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act.97  Effectively, this means an employer 
not only has the defense that an employee may pose a threat to others, but also that 
the employee may pose a threat to himself.98  The ADA and Rehabilitation Act offer 
protection to individuals who have disabilities but can perform the essential 
functions of a job.99  Judicial interpretation of the requirements of these statutes has 
often left individuals with HIV without adequate protection.100    
IV.  TWO LEADING CASES 
A.  Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Under Bragdon v. Abbott 
In the 1998 landmark case, Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court raised several issues 
involving AIDS as a disability.101  The first issue is whether a disability under the 
ADA includes asymptomatic HIV.  The second issue is whether a health care 
professional can refuse treatment because of the direct threat the patient poses to the 
health and safety of others. 
                                                                
96Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct. 2045 (2002).  
97Id. at 2050. 
98This is an issue that will not be significantly addressed in this note. 
99RANDY S. RABINOWITZ, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 2ND EDITION 900-908 
(ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 2002).  In Alabama v. Garrett the Supreme 
Court addressed whether the ADA exceeded congressional authority provided under the U.S. 
Constitution to enforce the equal protection rights of individuals with disabilities.  Bd. of 
Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  It came to the conclusion 
that the ADA did not meet the level of congruence and proportionality necessary to overcome 
the Eleventh Amendment protection to the states.  Id.  The ADA now joins Violence Against 
Women and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as laws deemed unconstitutional 
against the states. 
100Another statute that provides protection to employees that are sick or are disabled is the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  See Rabinowitz, supra note 99 at 91, 900-908.  The 
FMLA gives employees with serious health conditions up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave 
with guaranteed reinstatement to the employees’ position.  Id.  This gives qualifying 
individuals additional protection beyond the protection the ADA provides.  Id.  However, the 
employee must meet the criteria of FMLA to be a qualifying candidate.  Id.  The following are 
the main elements that must be met to qualify for FMLA protection.  Id.  The employers that 
are covered under the FMLA are all private employers that have fifty or more employees 
within a seventy-five mile radius and public sector employers without regard to their size.  Id.  
The employee requesting the leave must have been employed for a minimum of twelve 
months.  Id.  The serious injury or illness must meet the FMLA definition of serious health 
condition this is typically defined as incapacity or continuing treatment by a health care 
provider.  Id.  He must be unable to perform one or more essential functions of his job to 
qualify for FMLA leave.  Id.  If it is practical the employee must give thirty days notice to the 
employer if the leave is foreseeable.  Id. 
101Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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In this case, Sidney Abbot went to the office of Dr. Randon Bragdon for a dentist 
appointment.102  On the preliminary medical form, Abbot disclosed she was HIV 
positive.103  After finding a cavity, Dr. Bragdon informed her that he could not fill 
the cavity in his office but would perform the procedure in the hospital due to her 
HIV status.104  Abbott sued Bragdon under the ADA, pursuemt to the applicable 
provision of the statute105 that provides:  
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal employment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any person who operates a place of 
public accommodation.”106 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Abbot.107  It held that an 
HIV positive person is afforded protection under the ADA.108  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, restating the premise that the 
“Rehabilitation Act does not require the hiring of a person who posed a direct threat 
of communicating an infectious disease to others.”109  The issue here was whether 
Bragdon could refuse treatment to Abbott based on the threat she posed.110  Under 
ADA standards, Bragdon could refuse treatment only if Abbott’s disability “posed a 
direct threat to the health or safety of others.”111 
The definition for direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk to the health 
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, 
or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”112  The Supreme 
Court held that objective medical evidence along with the judgment of a health care 
professional should determine if a significant risk is present.113  However, the Court 
did not cite sufficient material in the record that an HIV positive individual posed no 
direct threat to the health and safety of others.114   
                                                                
102Id. 
103Id. 
104Id. 
10542 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
10642 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A public accommodation includes “the professional office of a 
health care provider.”   42 U.S.C. § 12182(7)(F). 
107See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629. 
108Id. 
109Id. at 626. 
110See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624. 
11142 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). 
11242 U.S.C. § 12182. 
113See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 626. 
114Id. at 630. 
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The Supreme Court first assessed whether the HIV infection was a disability 
under the ADA115 and held that it was.116  In answering this question the Court 
addressed three issues: (1) whether the HIV infection is a physical impairment;117  (2) 
is the life activity that respondent relies upon considered a major life activity under 
the ADA;118 and (3) whether the impairment substantially limits the major life 
activity.119   
The Court conceded that every agency that has considered the issue of HIV 
infected persons that are covered under the ADA has found that they are protected.120  
In addition, every court that had been presented with the question if an asymptomatic 
HIV individual is covered under the ADA had answered in the positive.121 
Plaintiff claimed that having HIV substantially limited a major life activity, 
namely pregnancy.  The Court stated that, “[i]n light of the immediacy with which 
the virus begins to damage the infected persons white blood cells and the severity of 
the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection.”122  The Court 
concluded that becoming pregnant and giving birth were major life activities.123  The 
Court stated that contrary to Bragdon’s contention that the ADA only covers public 
activities, the ADA covers private activities, such as caring for oneself.124  Because 
of AIDS’ lethal outcome and significant possibility of transmitting the disease to her 
                                                                
115See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 625.  “In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins 
to damage the infected persons white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold it is 
an impairment from the moment of infection.  As noted earlier, infection with HIV causes 
immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and the infected person’s white cell count 
continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated 
on the lymph nodes.  In light of these facts, HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological 
disorder with constant and detrimental effect on the infected hemic and lymphatic systems 
from the moment of infection.  HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition 
of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.”  Id. at 637. 
116Id. at 625. 
117 Id. 
118Id. 
119Id. at 631. 
120Id.at 642. 
121Id. at 644. 
122Id. at 637. 
123See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643.  “Our evaluation of the medical evidence leads us to 
conclude that respondent’s infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two 
independent ways.  First, a women infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on 
the newborn a significant risk of becoming infected.  The cumulative results of 13 studies 
collected in a 1994 textbook on AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of a woman with 
HIV, become HIV-positive themselves . . .”  (citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmission 
of HIV, [in AIDS Knowledge Base1.9-8, and tbl.2]). 
“Second, an infected woman risks infecting her child during gestation and child birth, i.e. 
prenatal transmission.  Petitioner concedes that women infected with HIV face about a 25% 
risk of transmitting the virus to their children .” Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
124See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640. 
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husband (through sexual intercourse) and child (through conception), the Supreme 
Court held in favor of plaintiff.125   
The Court also reviewed another issue asking if a private health care provider 
must perform invasive procedures on infectious patients in his office, and if courts 
should defer to the health care provider’s professional judgment?126  The Court 
considered substantial testimony from a number of health experts indicating that it is 
safe to treat patients infected with HIV in dental offices.127  Bragdon asserted that the 
use of high-speed drills and surface cooling with water created a risk of airborne 
HIV transmission.128  The Court concluded that the study on which Bragdon relied 
was inconclusive.129   
The Court’s holding demonstrates that respondent’s HIV infection falls within 
the ADA’s definition of disability.  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
First Circuit so that Bragdon could produce evidence proving that Abbott posed a 
significant risk of transmitting HIV.  On remand, the First Circuit held that a 
dentist’s cavity filling procedure on a patient does not pose a direct threat to 
others.130 
B.  Arline: The Four Prong Test 
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court first determined 
that a person suffering from a contagious disease can be disabled within the meaning 
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.131  In that case a teacher was fired from her 
job because of her tuberculosis infection.132  The termination occurred after her third 
relapse of tuberculosis within two years.133  After she was denied relief in state 
administrative proceedings she brought suit in federal court claiming that her 
termination constituted a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.134 
The trial court found it “difficult to conceive that Congress intended contagious 
diseases to be included within the definition of a handicapped person.”135  The court 
held that even if a person with an infectious disease could be considered a 
handicapped person, Arline was not qualified to teach.136   
                                                                
125Id. at 637. 
126Id. at 647. 
127Id. at 653. 
128Id. 
129Id. 
130Bragdon v. Abbott, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998). 
131School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), superseded by statute, 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, PUB. L. NO. 109-173 (amended 1992), as recognized in Shiring v. 
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996). 
132Id. at 276. 
133Id. at 276. 
134Id. 
135Id. at 277. 
136Id. 
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The court of appeals reversed.137  It held that “persons with contagious diseases 
are within the coverage of section 504.”138  It also held that Arline fit neatly into the 
statutory and regulatory framework of the Act.139  The court remanded the case to 
determine if the risks of infection precluded Arline from being otherwise qualified 
for the job and if it was possible to make reasonable accommodations for her.140   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  When determining if a particular 
individual is handicapped as defined by the Act it looked to the regulations published 
by the Department of Health and Human Services.141  The Court discussed the 
legislative history of section 504 and the Court stated that “history demonstrates that 
Congress was as concerned about the effect on an impairment on others as it was 
about its effect on the individual.”142  Using history and regulations, the Court held 
that allowing discrimination because a disease is contagious is inconsistent with the 
purpose of § 504.143   
The remaining question was whether Arline was otherwise qualified for the job 
of an elementary school teacher.  The Court stated that an individualized inquiry 
must be made in most cases144 and set forth a four factor test that need to be 
considered when conducting an inquiry.145  The four factors include the nature, 
duration, severity of the risk, and the probability that the disease will be 
transmitted.146  In Arline, the Court held that a person with an infectious disease 
“who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease is not 
otherwise qualified to perform his or her job.”147  A risk assessment must also be 
made as to whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee.148  In 
making the assessment one should defer to reasonable medical judgments of public 
health officials.149   
C.  Controversial Phrases 
Courts have applied the controversial statement in Arline that “a person who 
poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the 
workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable 
                                                                
137Id. 
138Id.  
139Id. 
140Arline, 480 U.S. at 277. 
141See Arline, 480 U.S. at 279. 
142Id. 
143Id. at 284. 
144Id. at 287. 
145Id.  at 288. 
146Id at 287, 288. 
147See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 288. 
148Id. at 288. 
149Id. at 274. 
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accommodation will not eliminate the risk”150 in many different ways.  The real 
question is what constitutes a significant risk.  Significance is not controlled by 
seriousness of the harm because “significance” relates to probability which is 
determined by an individualized inquiry.  From Arline, one can infer that the 
probability the risk will occur is the real meaning behind the phrase “significant 
risk.”151   
Federal courts disagree about what the probability must be to be considered a 
significant risk.  The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have followed a cautious rule.  
These courts have held that a theoretical possibility of transmitting AIDS is a 
sufficient showing of a “significant risk”.  Their view is that, “when transmitting a 
disease inevitably causes death the evidence supports a finding of significant risk if it 
shows both a certain event can occur and that according to medical opinion that 
event can transmit the disease.”152  This risk is not based on a medical opinion or 
evidence but instead on theory and fear. 
Conversely, the First Circuit has construed the phrase “significant risk” to mean 
that there is more than a possibility of some danger.153  In Bragdon, as discussed in 
the prior section, Dr. Bragdon refused services to an HIV infected individual.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the HIV infected individual.  
The Court stated that “Dr. Bragdon is not entitled to absolute safety.”154  The 
Supreme Court’s disposition on the issue of transmission of HIV is that there must 
be a significant risk for an individual not to be protected by the ADA or section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act.  Several circuits and district courts that do not follow the 
Court’s reasoning. 
V.  CASE LAW UNSUPPORTIVE OF HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY  
AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS 
A.  Health Care 
1.  Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center 
Regardless of existing medical evidence, courts feed on the stigma surrounding 
AIDS.  They are especially reluctant in healthcare cases to follow the guidance set 
forth under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  In Estate of Mauro v. Borgess 
Medical Center, the court failed to make a sound judicial analysis when a surgical 
technician was terminated from his position upon his employer discovering that he 
had AIDS.155  Before terminating Mauro, Borgess organized a task force to 
determine if an HIV-positive employee could safely perform the job responsibilities 
of a surgical technician.156  The committee determined that Mauro could not perform 
                                                                
150Id. at 287. 
151Id. at 273. 
152Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). 
153Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F. 3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997). 
154Id.  
155Estate of William C. Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998). 
156Id. at 400.  
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the essential job functions of a surgical technician if HIV-positive.  The district court 
granted Borgess’ motion for summary judgment, relying on the four factors laid out 
in Arline.157  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this 
holding that Mauro was not otherwise a qualified individual under the ADA.158   
Judge Boggs vigorously dissented contending that a “significant risk” means, by 
process of elimination, a small risk that is not harmful.159  The court failed to follow 
the Supreme Court’s instruction to consider the probability of infection of contagious 
disease160 and did not make an individualized inquiry as Arline requires.  Arline 
specifically states that there must be a direct threat or significant risk for the 
employee not to be protected by the Rehabilitation Act.161 
In addition, the Sixth Circuit did not take into account Mauro’s expert witnesses, 
even though they were both physicians.162  The majority held that a surgical 
technician may be required to participate in exposure-prone procedures.  The court 
simply concluded that because some risk existed, Mauro was not qualified.   
By contrast, Judge Boggs recognized that the ADA requires a legal assessment 
not “a sense of what we would prefer as an employer or patient.”163  He noted that 
the standard of significant risk means that employers may be required to expose their 
patients or others to some amount of risk.  Judge Boggs stated, “in some way, Mauro 
poses some risk.  It is not ontologically impossible for him to transmit a disease of 
very great lethality.  However, the chance that he will do so to any given patient is 
‘small.’”164  Judge Boggs pointed out that the court confuses exposure prone 
procedures with invasive procedures.165  Mauro testified that, “usually if I had my 
hands near the wound, it would be to like, on an abdominal incision, to kind of put 
your finger in and hold – kind of pull down on the muscle tissue and . . . pull that 
back.”166  There was no testimony that Mauro ever performed any procedures that 
would be considered exposure prone.  Under these circumstances, Judge Boggs 
concluded that it would be more appropriate for a jury to make the decision whether 
Mauro posed a significant risk of transmitting HIV to others.167   
Unlike the court, Judge Boggs attempted to precisely address the significance of 
the risk.  The CDC has estimated that, the risk to a single patient from an HIV-
positive surgeon ranges from .0024% (1 in 42,000 procedures) to .00024% (1 in 
                                                                
157Id. at 401. 
158Id. at 402. 
159See Mauro, 137 F.3d. at 408. 
160Id. at 409. 
161Id. 
162Id. 
163Id. at 407. 
164Id. at 408. 
165Id. 
166See Mauro, 137 F.3d. at 406. 
167Id. at 410. 
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417,000 procedures).”168  Mauro was a surgical technician who only touched the 
wound marginally, if at all.  Thus Mauro would pose a lower risk than a surgeon who 
only poses a risk ranging from .0024% to .00024%.169  Judge Boggs pointed out that 
there is a degree of risk to almost every action.   
[T]he perception of the significance of risk is subjective.  More than a few 
people refuse to fly, though commercial airlines are said to be safe 
compared to other modes of transportation.  There may be some people 
who refuse to cross streets.  Others go bungee–jumping.  So there is an 
inescapable normative component to the judgment of whether the chance 
that even a great peril will come to pass is “significant” or not.170 
Is this considered significant under the ADA standards?  There is no clear answer 
because the Mauro court did not define significant risk.  Instead, the court reacted to 
fear and misguided apprehension. 
The Sixth Circuit decided another related case as Mauro that same year, EEOC v. 
Prevo’s Family Market Inc.171  The case concerned an HIV–positive individual, and 
while not in the public safety or healthcare sector, it illustrates the fear of the court.  
The EEOC represented Steven Sharp, a produce worker at Prevo’s Market.172  Sharp 
had voluntarily disclosed that he was HIV positive.173  Consequently, he was 
reassigned to the cash room.174  Sharp was initially satisfied with the re-
assignment,175 but shortly after reassignment, he complained of unwanted questions 
by fellow employees and no contact with customers.176  He was granted paid leave 
and was requested to get a medical exam.177  Sharp did not go to Prevo’s doctors, 
instead preferring to go to his own.178  This was not satisfactory to Prevo’s Market, 
                                                                
168Id. at 409, quoting Doe v. University of Md., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995). 
169See Jennifer N. Coffin, “While not explicitly discussed in Estate of Mauro, one aspect 
of the CDC recommendations that may trouble courts is the reason given by the CDC for not 
recommending mandatory testing of health care workers.  The CDC reports that “[currently] 
available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of [health care 
workers] infected with HIV who perform invasive procedures not identified as exposure 
prone, provided the infected health care worker practice . . . universal precautions.”  Quoting 
Centers of Disease Control & Prevention Civil Rights Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and 
Americans with Disabilities Act-HIV-Infected Health Care Workers and the “Direct Threat” 
Defense, 66 TENN. L. REV. 311, 326-327 (1998).  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive 
Procedures, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jul. 12, 1991 at 1,4.  
170See Mauro, 137 F.3d at 410. 
171EEOC v. Prevo Family Market, Inc., 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998). 
172Id. at 1091. 
173Id. 
174Id. 
175Id. 
176Id. 
177EEOC, 135 F.3d at 1091. 
178Id. 
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and Sharp was dismissed from his position ten months later.179  The court found that 
the job presented a grave enough risk that it was a necessity to require a medical 
examination mandated by the employer.180  The court also held that it was lawful to 
reassign an employee without any objective evidence that the employee was a direct 
threat to others.181   
The majority asserted that it was a business necessity that Sharp went for a 
medical examination.  However, the ADA provides that a covered entity shall not 
require a medical examination unless it is shown to be job related and consistent with 
a business necessity.182  According to the ADA, a recognized legitimate business 
practice is as follows: “1) when an employee is having difficulty performing his or 
her job effectively; 2) when an employee becomes disabled on the job or wishes to 
return to work after suffering an illness; 3) if an employee requests an 
accommodation; and 4) if medical examination, screening, and monitoring is 
required by other laws.”183  Sharp’s situation did not fit any of the scenarios.   
Judge Moore dissented and indicated the flaws in the majority’s opinion.184  She 
analogized the majority’s opinion to treatment of black Americans in the 1940’s.185  
She stated that the majority’s opinion would only fuel unfounded fear, prejudice, 
ignorance, and myth.186  Judge Moore also cited the CDC, asserting neither HIV nor 
AIDS has ever appeared on the list of infectious diseases that could be transmitted 
through the handling of food.187 
The next major flaw in the majority’s opinion is that after the grocery store 
reassigned Sharp, it lawfully could not require a medical examination because it did 
not satisfy a business purpose.188  The flaw with the majority’s opinion is that the 
very purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination and exclusions that have no 
supporting evidence.  The dissent also stated that the probability of Sharp infecting a 
fellow produce worker was one in ten million under normal circumstances.189  If 
there is direct contact then the risk of transmission increases to one in forty thousand 
to one in four hundred thousand depending on the study.190  From the statistical data, 
no direct threat exists.  Even if there were, Sharp could still be a qualified worker if 
he could be reasonably accommodated.  This could be accomplished by providing 
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185Id. at 1099. 
186Id. 
187Id. 
188Id. at 1101. 
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Sharp his own knives and giving him gloves to wear.191  The dissent pointed out that 
the majority singled out Sharp, but failed to acknowledge that using bloody knives is 
a risk for all blood borne pathogens.192  Prevo’s should have adopted universal safety 
procedures.193  Moore’s dissent condemned the majority opinion, “[in] that it allows 
employers to elevate fear over facts, ignorance over information, and mythology 
over medicine.”194 
2.  Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center 
In Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,195 the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly engaged in a conclusionary analysis that a 
small risk is a significant risk.196  Bradley, also a surgical technician, was infected 
with the HIV virus.  When his infection became known to the hospital, it reassigned 
him to assist in the purchasing department.197  Bradley claimed that his reassignment 
violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendant and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.   
The appellate court purported to follow Arline’s four-part test.  The court referred 
to the guidelines provided by the CDC but failed to heed them.  “The CDC states that 
‘the risk of transmitting HBV (Hepatitis B virus) from an infected HCW (Health 
Care Worker) to a patient is small, and the risk of transmitting HIV is likely to be 
even smaller.’”198  The court admitted that the risk of transmission was minimal but it 
claimed that it is still significant.199  The court was in agreement with the hospital 
that there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for Bradley.200  The 
hospital claimed that even Bradley’s presence in the operating room posed too grave 
of a risk for the hospital and its patients.201  The court concluded that Bradley’s HIV-
positive status gave the hospital grounds to reassign him.202  The Fifth Circuit did not 
give deference to reasonable medical judgments of public health officers at the CDC. 
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3.  Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation 
Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation203 involved a 
resident in neurosurgery who was infected with the HIV virus who filed suit against 
the University of Maryland for violating the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.  Doe was 
stuck with an HIV contaminated needle while under the employment of the 
hospital.204  He subsequently tested positive for the HIV virus.205  The hospital, after 
learning of Doe’s condition, consulted a panel of experts.206  The panel suggested 
that Doe be able to continue in his position with the exception of not performing one 
procedure that included wire.207  The hospital did not take the advice of its own 
panel, instead offering Doe alternative positions in non-surgical fields.208  When Doe 
refused to accept another position the hospital terminated him.209   
In the words of the district court, Arline factors “discount . . . the severity of 
anticipated harms by the statistical probability that they will occur.” 210  Arguably, 
the court itself admitted that it did not follow a leading Supreme Court decision.  The 
factors the court looked at were heavily based on emotion, not the law.  In the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the court stated “there may presently be 
no documented case of surgeon-to-patient transmission, [but] such a transmission 
clearly is possible.”211  The ADA and Arline, the two guiding bodies of law, do not 
define “significant risk” or a “direct threat” as just a possibility.  As Doe argued the 
risk cannot be so infinitesimal and still be considered a significant risk.212  The 
hospital admitted that the risk of transmission was small and quoted the CDC but 
would not follow CDC guidelines.213  The CDC suggests that surgeons should be 
allowed to practice invasive procedures but that a hospital may bar HIV-positive 
surgeons from exposure prone procedures.  The court’s opinion cited to the 
possibility of a surgeon cutting himself with a sharp instrument and then bleeding 
directly into the patient’s wound.214  The court further declared that there was a 
possibility of transmission by Doe to a patient that constituted a grave enough risk.215 
The court held that the hospital was not in violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation 
Act.   
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4.  Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc 
A recent decision in the Eleventh Circuit, Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental 
Associates, Inc., concerned a dental hygienist who was HIV-positive and was 
terminated because he could not be reasonably accommodated in accordance with 
the ADA.216  Valley Forge employed Spencer Waddell from early 1996 through 
October 1997.217  In September of 1997, Waddell was tested to determine if he 
carried the HIV virus.218  Waddell was notified shortly afterward that he did indeed 
test positive for the virus.219  Valley Forge placed Waddell on paid leave while they 
determined what his future would be at Valley Forge.220  After Valley Forge studied 
medical journals, it determined that Waddell posed a significant risk and he could no 
longer work as a dental hygienist.221  Waddell was offered a clerical job at half the 
salary of dental hygienist.222  He refused the position.223   
Subsequently, Waddell brought suit and sought relief under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act.224  Both Waddell and Valley Forge filed for summary 
judgment.225  Valley Forge admitted that Waddell’s termination resulted solely from 
his status has being HIV positive.226  The district court found that Waddell’s job 
entailed “exposure prone” procedures.227  The district court ruled in favor of Valley 
Forge’s summary judgment.  The court held that Waddell posed a direct threat to 
others following the standard set forth in Onishea v. Hopper.228  Onishea elaborated 
the meaning of a “significant risk.”  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
held that evidence supports a finding of significant risk if it shows that both a 
significant event can occur and that according to reliable medical opinions the event 
can transmit the disease.229  The court noted that even if the probability of 
transmission is low, death itself makes the risk significant.230   
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The Waddell appellate court held that the district court properly granted summary 
judgment to Valley Forge because Waddell posed a significant risk of HIV 
transmission.231  The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision.  The 
district court had concentrated on the fourth factor in Arline – the probability of HIV 
transmission between a dental hygienist and a patient.232  Reviewing several factors, 
such as the proximity of sharp objects and flesh, the appellate court determined that 
there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for Waddell.233   
The Eleventh Circuit, however, only discusses a theoretical possibility; it never 
considers the probability of an actual occurrence.  The risk was admittedly small.  
Waddell’s medical expert attested to the fact that the, “hygienist’s fingers and dental 
instruments are rarely in the patient’s mouth at the same time.”234  The court’s 
opinion discusses the possibility of blood-to-blood contact between Waddell and a 
patient.235  According to the law it has to be a significant possibility not just a 
“possibility.”236  The Eleventh Circuit, like many courts addressing the issue, 
purported to address the fourth factor of Arline, the probability of HIV transmission 
between a dental hygienist and patient.  The court conceded that, “Waddell 
performed some procedures that entailed the use of sharp instruments, there was a 
risk that he could cut or prick himself and bleed into an open wound . . . .”237  The 
court effectually holds that some risk constitutes a significant risk.   
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision conflicts with the preceding authority of 
Bragdon and Arline.  In Bragdon, the Court held that courts should defer to agency 
interpretations.238  The court in Waddell does not rely on medical experts in forming 
its opinion.  Waddell presented two appellate court amicus briefs from the American 
Dental Association and the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors 
in favor of his position.  Additionally, the Infectious Diseases Society and American 
Dental Association of America (IDSA) filed briefs with the U.S. Supreme Court.239  
Each of these four briefs support Waddell’s claim that he did not pose a significant 
risk of transmission when universal precautions were used.240  IDSA and CSTE argue 
that, “such determinations by the 11th Circuit and other federal appeals courts are 
creating the incorrect presumption that defendants in the position of dental practice 
here can claim the ‘direct threat’ defense to an ADA suit against them until there is 
absolutely zero risk of disease transmission.”241   
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Comparing Waddell to Bragdon, the results are not consistent.  In Bragdon, the 
United States Supreme Court held that Abbott, the HIV infected person, was 
protected under the ADA.  The instruments and general procedures which are 
involved in both cases are similar.  Bragdon was filling a cavity and Waddell 
customarily cleaned teeth.  The holding in Waddell, denying the healthcare provider 
protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, is inconsistent with medical 
evidence and prior Supreme Court decisions.  If the Eleventh Circuit had followed 
precedent, the district court’s ruling would have been reversed.   
B.  Fire 
1.  Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby 
Mandatory testing for the HIV virus is an issue that is prevalent in employment.  
Its legitimacy depends on the probability of transmission, in the particular 
employment setting.  A case that discusses this issue is Anonymous Fireman v. City 
of Willoughby.242  Plaintiff, a fireman and paramedic, was transported without any 
prior notice to a lab that tested for HIV.  He objected to the test but was told that it 
was mandatory.  The district court addressed the issue if mandatory testing for HIV 
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.243  The city argued 
that mandatory testing is proper because “AIDS is an epidemic and firefighters and 
paramedics are high-risk employees and are at risk to contract and or transmit the 
AIDS in their line of duty.”244  Plaintiff’s position was that this non-consensual 
taking of blood is an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.245  The city responded that because the blood was drawn in an annual 
physical examination it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Dr. Leonard 
Calabrese, an expert witness for the plaintiff, viewed the occupational risk for 
firefighters as well as health care providers to be low for transmitting or being 
infected by the HIV virus.  Dr. Michael Lederman, another expert witness agreed. 246  
The expert witnesses for the defendants stated that universal precautions are not 
practical and therefore HIV infected firefighters pose a significant risk to the 
public.247 
The district court held that mandatory testing of firemen and paramedics for HIV 
was legal.  The court agreed with defendant’s expert witnesses that universal 
precautions were not practical.  It held that there was no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because not all searches are unreasonable.  Testing firefighters infringed 
on minimal privacy interests and therefore was considered reasonable by this court.  
Finally, the court rationalized that because of the high-risk nature of the work that 
mandatory AIDS testing was legal.248   
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From an objective stance, this does not seem logical.  The district court does not 
realistically view the probability that a transmission would occur, only the harm that 
would occur if it did.  Universal precautions must be in place according to the law.  
If universal precautions are not in place, logically then all public safety and heath 
care workers themselves are at risk of being infected by a person that they assist.  
Firefighters and health care workers themselves need to be protected from blood 
born pathogens.  The more significant effect that mandatory AIDS testing has is that 
it does not encourage the use of universal precautions.  It feeds the stigma associated 
with AIDS in that it fosters the belief that HIV is transmitted by casual contact.   
VI.  CASE LAW SUPPORTING HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY  
AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS 
A.  Healthcare 
1.  John Doe v. Oregon Resorts 
A different scenario is a case where a man’s wife was infected with the AIDS 
virus and he worked on the ski patrol.  In John Doe v. Oregon Resorts,249 the 
employer alleged that Doe posed a significant risk to others because of his risk of 
being HIV-positive.  The risk was his association with his HIV infected wife and the 
possibility of him contracting the disease and then exposing others to the disease.250  
Oregon Resorts mandated that Doe be tested in order to keep his job as a ski 
patrolman.251  The duties of ski patrol are to assist other medical personnel such as 
intermediate level EMTs and physicians on the mountain.252  These duties may also 
include collecting needles when cleaning up an area.253  Ski patrol, are not allowed to 
incubate, start IVs, perform injections,254 or perform other invasive procedures.255 
This case deals with discrimination by association.  The district court held that 
the employer violated the ADA when it transferred ski patroller John Doe to another 
position.256  The court followed Arline.  The court emphasized analyzing the fourth 
prong of the test, probability of transmission.257  Relying on expert witnesses, 
including Dr. Mark Loveless, the court found the risk to be insignificant.258  Dr. 
Loveless noted the extensive studies conducted on HIV and its transmission.259  To 
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help illustrate the improbability of John Doe transmitting the disease through his ski 
patrol activities, the doctor noted, “[that] plaintiff’s risk of contracting HIV from his 
wife through a single sexual episode was low.”260  Another expert witness, Dr. 
Chunn “acknowledged that even when health care providers are providing care 
involving deep body cavity work where the employer’s hands are not visible, studies 
have shown that transmission is rare.”261   
Admittedly, this case differs from Mauro or Doe v. Medical Corps., because Joe 
Doe position did not require him to use needles, administer IVs, or engage in 
invasive procedures.  John Doe, however, still came into contact with bleeding 
wounds and faced extreme and dangerous conditions.262  Nevertheless the district 
court followed the guidelines set forth in Arline, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation 
Act.  The court deferred to the knowledge of doctors who have studied the risk of 
transmission of HIV.263  The court also disclosed that there was a possibility of 
transmission, but that the possibility was so low that it [did] not constitute a 
“significant risk.”264  In addition, if universal precautions are utilized the statistical 
the risk becomes infinitesimal.  Doe was entitled to reinstatement to his position as 
ski patrolman.265 
B.  Fire 
1.  Doe v. District of Columbia 
In Doe v. District of Columbia,266 the court held that applicant John Doe 
established a prima facie case pursuant to the ADA.  Doe applied for a position with 
the District of Columbia’s fire department as a firefighter.267  Here, a physical exam 
was given, and if the applicant passed the exam he was acknowledged to be fully 
capable of performing the duties of a firefighter without risk to himself or others.268  
Doe passed the exam and was sent a letter of appointment.269  The letter stated that 
Doe was on probationary status during his first year, and if there was any derogatory 
information found, he would be terminated.270  Fearful that his HIV-positive status 
would be discovered, he called an official at the fire department and disclosed that he 
was infected with the disease.271  He was told not to report for duty.272  He was never 
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told that the decision to hire him was rescinded nor was he told to come into work.273  
Doe thereinafter sued the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983274 and the Rehabilitation 
Act.275  
The district court held that the city violated the Rehabilitation Act.276  The district 
court reassured that the firefighters wear protective gear when they are performing 
their job responsibilities.277  The gear includes a helmet, hood, bunker coat, bunker 
pants, gloves, and bunker boots,278 all of which are made of heavy, thick material.  
An expert witness, Dr. Parenti, Associate Professor of Medicine in the Division of 
Infectious Disease at George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, 
D.C., testified that an asymptomatic HIV-positive person has no impairment of his 
physical capabilities such as his strength, agility, or ability to breathe.279  It is 
difficult to transfer the HIV virus.  This is reflected by the low percentage of health 
care workers that have contracted the disease on the job.280  According to Dr. Parenti 
“there is ‘no measurable’ risk that the disease will be transmitted through 
performance of fire fighting duties . . . .”281  He equated the possibility of 
transmitting the disease while on the job with the probability of “getting struck by a 
meteor while walking down Constitution Avenue in Washington D.C..”282  Katherine 
West, a certified nurse in the specialty of infection control at the Association for 
Practitioners in Infection Control, supports this finding.283  She is employed at the 
George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences in 
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Washington D.C..284  She testified that all the protective gear that the firefighters 
utilize eliminates the risk of blood-to-blood contact.  She is quoted as saying that the 
risk of HIV transmission is “so remote” and “extremely small.”285  She also attested 
to the fact that several fire departments throughout the United States employ HIV-
positive firefighters in active-duty status.286  In addition there are no reported cases of 
HIV transmission during the course of fire fighting duties.287  Both Dr. Parenti and 
Ms. West found that an HIV-infected person poses no measurable risk of 
transmitting the disease through the performance of fire fighting duties.288   
The district court found Doe passed the physical examination and was able to do 
the job sufficiently before the city discovered that Doe was HIV-positive.289  Doe’s 
HIV status did not impair his ability to perform his duties as a firefighter.  The 
district court followed the guidelines of Arline and deferred to the experts.290  It 
emphasized that the testimony was uncontested.  The evidence supported the court’s 
finding that an HIV asymptomatic firefighter poses no measurable risk of 
transmitting the disease.291  The defense failed to rebut Doe’s prima facie showing 
that he was discriminated against because of his HIV-positive status.292  The court 
ordered that Doe be reinstated, that the city pay him back - pay with interest, and 
compensatory damages of $25,000 and attorney fees and court costs.293  The court 
gave a very strong statement about fostering fear and misguided apprehension.   
“In the context of race the Supreme Court, has warned:  The Constitution cannot 
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.  Private biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly give them 
effect.   ‘Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a 
constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice 
that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.’”294 
C.  Police 
1.  Holiday v. City of Chattanooga  
Holiday v. City of Chattanooga295 involved a police officer who was denied 
employment with the city solely because he was HIV-positive.  In 1993, Holiday 
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submitted an application to the City for employment in its police department.  He 
subsequently took a written examination and completed a physical agility test.296  He 
was invited for an interview and was granted a conditional offer of employment 
subject to a physical and psychological exam.297  During the exam, Holiday 
voluntarily told the doctor that he had been diagnosed with HIV and that he was 
anemic.298  The doctor told him that he passed the exam.299  However, an employee 
from the doctor’s called the police department and informed them that Holiday had 
failed the physical.300  The doctor said Holiday was weak and unable to perform the 
work.301  However, in actuality he was asymptomatic.302  Louis Holiday brought suit 
against the City of Chattanooga under the ADA, charging that the city refused to hire 
him as a police officer because he was infected with HIV.303 
The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment.304  It held that 
Holiday did not show that he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job.305  The Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment 
de novo.306  The court of appeals found that the district court made no individualized 
inquiry regarding Holiday.307  The ADA mandates an individualized inquiry in 
determining whether an employee’s disability or other condition disqualifies him 
from a particular position.308  There was no evidence that proved that Holiday could 
not perform the job properly.309  He was asymptomatic at the time of his physical 
examination with Dr. Dowlen.310  At the time of the examination, Dr. Dowlen made 
no assessments as to if Holiday was experiencing any fatique, sluggishness, or 
shortness of breath.311  The Sixth Circuit held that granting summary judgment was 
improper because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Holiday 
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a police officer.  When 
Holiday inquired as to why he was not hired the city’s office administrator told him 
                                                                
296Id. 
297Id. 
298See Holiday, 206 F.3d at 641. 
299Id. 
300Id. 
301Id. 
302Id. at 644. 
303Holiday, 206 F.3d at 640. 
304Id. at 642. 
305Id. at 643. 
306Id. at 642. 
307Id. 
308Holiday, 206 F.3d at 643. 
309Id. 
310Id. at 644. 
311Id. 
70 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 19:39 
that she could not, “put other employee’s at risk by hiring [him] . . . .”312  This 
emphasizes the point that the job offer was contingent on Holiday’s HIV status.  The 
city’s conclusion had no medical support. At the court of appeals, the city changed 
its position conceding that Holiday posed no threat to the health and safety of 
others.313 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.314  The 
Sixth Circuit held that Holiday was entitled to be evaluated on his abilities and 
relevant medical evidence rather than on “fear, ignorance, or misconceptions.”315  
They also found that Holiday adduced sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the city refused to hire him because he was HIV-positive.316   
Comparatively, the Sixth Circuit did not make the same type of review and 
analysis in Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center as they did in Holiday.  Both Mauro 
and Holiday argued that their respective district courts erred in concluding that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact.317  In Holiday, the court went through a 
systematic analysis of the four factors in Arline and whether the City had made an 
individualized inquiry.  The court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did 
exist.  It discussed that the opinion of one doctor was not sufficient for the City or 
the district court to conclude that Holiday was not qualified for a position as a police 
officer.  In the opinion the Sixth Circuit stated, “courts need not defer to an 
individual’s doctor’s opinion that is neither based on the individualized inquiry 
mandated by the ADA nor supported by objective scientific medical evidence.”318   
In addition, the court discussed the objective evidence.  First Holiday was 
asymptomatic and showed no physical signs of the infection; indeed he was in good 
physical condition.  The court examined what a typical police officer may encounter 
on the job.  The judges stated that the use of force, wrestling, and striking suspects 
may result in injury to both the police officer and the suspect, but the court 
concluded that in light of the objective medical evidence, the risk of transmitting 
HIV was so low that it is not significant.  Under the ADA the risk must be significant 
for an individual not to be protected.   
The Sixth Circuit in Mauro, two years prior to Holiday, did not make this 
individualized analysis.  Mauro argued that the probability of transmission was so 
slight that it did not constitute a significant risk.  Mauro presented the evidence of 
CDC recommendations regarding HIV employees that states the risk from healthcare 
worker to patient is very small.319  The court viewed the report as not complete.  The 
report differentiated between exposure prone and invasive procedures.  To perform 
exposure prone procedures strict guidelines should be followed and an expert panel 
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should advise.  For an invasive procedure the universal precautions are sufficient.  
Mauro usually did not even assist in surgery.  His job duties mainly included giving 
the necessary surgical instrument(s) to the doctor during surgery.320  The court 
rejected Mauro’s argument on the ground that because some risk existed Mauro 
posed a direct threat to the safety of others.   
In both cases some risk existed.  In Holiday it was a police officer that might get 
injured during a pursuit of a suspect.  In Mauro it was a surgical technician that on 
rare occasion assisted a surgeon for a brief moment.  Arguably, on a daily basis 
Holiday had more direct contact with open wounds than Mauro because job duties of 
a police officer include wrestling and striking to subdue suspects.321  Mauro 
infrequently assisted with surgeries.  Therefore Holiday probably posed a greater risk 
than Mauro to the safety of others.  However, the Sixth Circuit did not rule or 
analyze the cases similarly.  This is consistent with the impression that the court’s 
reasoning is based not on logic but on fear. 
2.  Doe v. Chicago 
The district court in Doe v. Chicago322 reviewed a motion to dismiss a claim 
alleging violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act.323  John and Jane applied for 
positions as police officers.324  Both applicants passed the written and psychological 
examinations.325  The City of Chicago Police Department tested Joe and Jane Doe for 
HIV without their consent.326  Additionally, their applications for jobs as police 
officers were rejected solely because they were HIV positive.327  John Doe received a 
conditional offer of employment, prior to the physical fitness examination conducted 
by Dr. Bransfield.328  Jane Doe did not receive an offer.329  Neither plaintiff gave 
consent to the HIV test, nor were provided counseling prior to the testing.330  
Afterward both plaintiffs were notified that they were HIV positive and they were 
not provided with any counseling.331  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
maintained a “custom, practice, or policy” of: “1) testing candidates for HIV as a 
condition of employment without medical justification; 2) requiring a physical 
examination prior to proving candidates with a valid conditional offer of 
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employment; 3) failing to obtain consent or provide counseling with regard to HIV 
tests; and 4) refusing to hire candidates solely because of their HIV-positive 
status.”332  The city moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that the plaintiffs failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.333 
The district court analyzed the testing provision of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Plaintiffs alleged that the city used the result of the medical tests 
to discriminate against them.  The court found that discriminatory use of medical 
testing is specifically prohibited under Section 504.334  The court held that the city 
was not testing in order to determine an applicant’s ability to perform the job.335  The 
court stated that the “defendants acted knowingly and intentionally . . . and with 
reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ rights.”336  The court ruled that the 
city’s attempt to dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 504 claims of the Rehabilitation Act was 
moot.337 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
People in the United States need to gain control of the unfounded but prevalent 
fear of casual contact with HIV.  It has been twenty years since AIDS was first 
mentioned.  The treatment surrounding the disease is similar to the treatment of those 
that supported communism in the 1950s.  Early in the 1950’s in the era of 
McCarthyism, artists were blacklisted and many others lost employment because of 
an incredible fear of communism.  One of the earliest cases was Dennis v. United 
States.338  The defendants, were supporters and advocates of communism, convicted 
for conspiring to overthrow the government.339  In Dennis those that were on trial 
were convicted on the basis of a modified version of the clear and present danger 
formula.340  The test was, if the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability 
justifies an invasion of free speech it is necessary to avoid the danger.  In Dennis, 
people were convicted on the premise that they believed in an idea.  In light of the 
enormity of the evil apprehended, overthrowing the U.S. government, the Court was 
focused simply upon the possibility, not the probability of its occurrence.  It was not 
until 1957, when the convictions of fourteen “second string” communist leaders 
reached the Supreme Court in Yates v. U.S.,341 that McCarthy had died, and so had 
McCarthyism.  Strong anticommunist sentiment persisted but the analysis of the risk 
was construed differently.  In Yates, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, acquitted 
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the five defendants and remanded to the lower court for proceedings against the other 
defendants.342  The Court distinguished advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract 
idea from advocacy of action.  Punishment is not justified for simply advocating the 
overthrow of the government but must include specifically promoting obstruction of 
the government.  After McCarthyism ended, people were prosecuted if they had the 
intent to do harm.  The assessment of risk differs in the latter case because there is 
more of an emphasis on the likelihood of the harm occurring rather than just the idea 
of it happening. 
The similarity between the strong anti-communist movement and the treatment of 
those HIV-positive is that both are supported by fear instead of rational and logic.  
Akin to this is the treatment of AIDS.  Millions of dollars have been dedicated for 
research on the disease.  A number of studies and the leading government agency, 
the CDC, all have supported the continuation of public safety and healthcare workers 
in their professions.  The courts have not adhered to the medical evidence or CDC 
guidelines when determining cases.   
The assessment of risk is the disparity between the cases that support HIV 
individuals keeping their jobs and those cases that do not.  Courts vary on how 
closely they examine the objective evidence that is presented to them.  There is also 
a large discrepancy as to what is considered a “significant risk”.  The courts that are 
supportive of a healthcare or public safety employee continuing in his position 
follow the guidelines set forth by the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.  They carefully 
scrutinize the possibility of transmission.  These courts typically do not adhere to the 
misperception and fear surrounding HIV/AIDS.  Courts have difficulty in dealing 
with assessment of risk where there is an ultimate risk involved.  Now, twenty years 
into the epidemic, the risk is four persons assisted out of every hundred billion 
contacts.  As Judge Boggs’ dissent in Mauro emphasized, the assessment of risk is 
subjective.343  There are people that go bungee jumping and then there are others that 
refuse to fly.  The chance of being struck by lightening is much higher than the 
probability of contracting HIV from a public safety or healthcare provider.  Society 
goes about its business during electrical storms, but despite the much lower risk, 
many courts have not permitted HIV positive health care and safety workers to 
continue in their occupations.  There is a degree of risk to every human behavior.  
The issue is does an infinitesimal risk justify a growing population of HIV positive 
persons being cast out of occupations.  The “[f]ear of harm ought to be proportional 
not merely to the gravity of the harm, but also to the probability of the event.”344 
                                                                
342Yates, 354 U.S at 338. 
343See Mauro, 137 F.3d at 409. 
344Antoine Arnaud et al., La Loqique, Ou L’Art De Penser (1682—1668), in THE 
EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, 
INDUCTION, AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 77 (Ian Hacking 1975), quoted in, AGAINST THE 
GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 71 (Peter L. Berstein 1996). 
